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1 Introduction 
 The occurrence of bad shocks might have severe consequences on households' 
welfare, particularly in developing countries where insurance is scarce. A large body of the 
literature has focused on the welfare losses caused by shock realizations (Dehejia and Gatti, 
2002, and Beegle et al., 2006). These studies mainly focus on how families cope with 
shocks ex post, i.e. after shocks have happened and uncertainty resolved.  
 However, the impact of uncertainty on households’ decisions can also be studied by 
observing whether families change their strategies ex ante, i.e. before a shock materializes. 
A branch of the literature, the so-called precautionary saving literature, has examined how 
the presence of uncertainty (i.e. income uncertainty) affects consumption/saving decisions 
(Sandmo, 1970; Deaton, 1992). A key finding is that, assuming convexity of the marginal 
utility, riskier environments make households defer current consumption in favor of future 
consumption, by generating a precautionary buffer stock of asset. 
 Despite the fundamental role of uncertainty for developing countries, its impact on 
human capital accumulation has not been extensively analyzed. Exceptions are represented 
by Kodde (1986), Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Pouliot (2006). These studies show that 
adding uncertainty to human capital returns causes human capital investments to be 
inefficiently low, even in presence of perfect capital markets. While these studies introduce 
uncertainty in (future) earnings, the effect of exogenous income uncertainty on schooling 
decisions has not received much attention, with the recent exception of Fitzimos (2007). 
 This paper aims at filling this gap, by looking both theoretically and empirically at 
how exogenous income (such as parental income) uncertainty affects human capital 
accumulation, in presence and in absence of perfect capital markets.  
 
2 Theoretical framework 
Following Baland and Robinson (2000) and Pouliot (2006), consider a 
representative household that maximizes a utility function over two periods, by choosing 
optimal savings (s) and school time (hs) of their children. Parental income is exogenously 
equal to Y in period one, and stochastic in period two and equal to A~  such that: 
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The household's optimization problem is:  
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where c1 and c2 are household consumption levels at time 1 and 2, r the interest rate and β 
the subjective discount factor. The salary earned by children in the labor market is w, 
whereas f(hs) is the (certain) salary of the grown-up children in period 2. U is a concave 
utility function.    
Putting w= β=1 and r=0 to simplify notation, child schooling is efficient when the 
marginal return to human capital equals the return on the financial market: 
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Hence, stochastic parental income does not affect the efficiency of schooling 
choices. The reason is that equation (3) holds with and without uncertainty.  
The optimal value of child schooling, however, changes if liquidity constraints bind, 
and households cannot freely borrow their desired amount to keep their consumption 
smooth over time.  
If liquidity constraints are introduced into the model, saving has always to be 
greater than a certain threshold, s : 
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The associated Lagrangian function is: 
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. In an interior solution, λ will be zero, and child 
schooling efficient. 
If optimal saving is smaller than s , the following inequality holds: 
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This implies that liquidity constrained households are under-investing in schooling, 
as in Pouliot (2006).  
How does this solution compare to that without uncertainty? Let Csh  ( Ush )  be 
optimal choices with certainty (uncertainty). The first order conditions for Csh  are given by 
(7) and (8), and by (9) and (10) for Ush :  
( 7)  CCsCs hfsAEuhsYu λ+++=−− ))(~(')('  
( 8)  ),('))(~(')(' CsCsCs hfhfsAEuhsYu ++=−−  
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Comparing equation (8) with (10), we obtain that school hours in the presence of 
uncertainty are higher than in its absence. Assuming convex marginal utility, we have:  
( 11)  ).('))(~(')(' CsCsCs hfhfsAEuhsYu ++<−−  
 
Notice that, in order to make (11) hold as an equality, it is required that Csh  be 
smaller than Ush .  
Thus, among non-savers, uncertainty generates a buffer stock through additional 
education. When the credit market is characterized by financial restrictions, households 
cannot resort to borrowing to accomplish their preference for consumption smoothing. 
However, the same constrained households will resort to less borrowing, even if they are 
allowed to, when they are exposed to a riskier environment. The (latent) reduced need to 
borrow on the financial market is translated into additional educational investments, whose 
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return rate is higher than that on the capital markets. As saving is constrained to equal its 
lower bound, and additional resources cannot be borrowed, investments in education act as 
a substitute for saving.  
 
3 Data and Empirical Results 
Our data derive from a four-round panel survey of households’ living standards 
conducted in Kagera (Tanzania) from 1991 to 1994 (more details are in Alderman et al., 
2009).    
 We select all children aged 7-15 in the last round of the panel, while the first three 
rounds are exploited to construct our income variability measure.  
The following equation is estimated: 
 
( 12)  Hi = β1LCi +β2 uncertaintyi+β3 LC * uncertaintyi + β4 Xi + νi .    
 
Hi stands for child i’s hours of school in the week previous to the interview. In view 
of the censored nature of the dependent variable, we estimate Tobit models.1 X is a set of 
regressors that include community, household and individual controls.  
 Similarly to the precautionary saving literature (e.g., Guariglia and Rossi, 2002), we 
use parental income variability to capture uncertainty surrounding parental income. We 
construct income variability of the household (uncertaintyi) as the log of the sample 
variance of crop loss during the first three rounds of the panel. To derive this measure, we 
first purge the predicted component of crop loss from its total value, by regressing crop loss 
on a set of community variable dummies.2 The rationale behind the choice of crop shocks 
as a measure of uncertainty relies on the fact that variability in parental income is mainly 
determined by the variability in agricultural returns. As agriculture is the main activity in 
this environment, crop variability is likely to be the main source of exogenous income 
variability.  
                                               
1
 We also estimated simple Probit models for school attendance obtaining results consistent with those of the 
Tobit model. 
2
 In each wave, each household is asked whether they experienced any crop loss during the previous six 
months. If the answer is yes, they are also asked the monetary value of the loss. 
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The key variables of the empirical analysis are uncertainty, an indicator for 
households potentially liquidity constrained (LCi) and their interaction.  
To capture credit market restrictions, we use a dummy (NoDurables) indicating 
whether the child’s household does not own any durable goods. The absence of durables 
that may function as collaterals plausibly increases the likelihood of being liquidity 
constrained in the credit market. We also considered the amount of financial wealth the 
household owns. Financial assets can be easily converted in cash, potentially providing a 
more flexible instrument to smooth consumption than durables. NoSavings is our indicator 
for the absence of household savings. 
The results in Table 2, column 1, show that the absence of durable assets is strongly 
significant in reducing children's schooling. Notice that the presence of uncertainty per se is 
not statistically significant, in line with the theoretical predictions of the model. However, 
coherently with the latter, we find that the interaction term has a positive impact on 
schooling. Among children born to families who are restricted on the credit market, those 
facing more uncertainty exhibit higher school attendance and hours of schooling than those 
who live in a less risky environment.  
The estimated coefficients can be used to compute various marginal effects, taking 
into account the interaction term in (13). In particular, we find that the probability of  
school attendance is 12 percentage points lower for those who are liquidity constrained than 
for those who are not. Moreover, school intensity can be shown to drop by about 7 hours 
per week for children belonging to the former group. Hence, the limited access to the credit 
market generates inefficiently low level of educational investment.  
The presence of uncertainty increases schooling, but only for households who are 
liquidity constrained. For the latter households, doubling the variability of parental income 
has a sizeable effect, increasing school intensity by about an hour, while the impact on the 
unconstrained is a non-statistically significant reduction of 0.6 hours. Hence, the presence 
of uncertainty mitigates the inefficiency due to frictions on the credit markets. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of various individual, household and 
community level controls (column 2). Moreover, the results also hold if liquidity 
constrained households are identified more restrictively as those with no current savings 
(column 3). 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper shows that, when households face binding liquidity constraints, an 
increase in parental income uncertainty leads to a rise in the amount of time children spend 
in school. Using panel data from rural Tanzania, we provide empirical support for such a 
theoretical prediction. The results suggest that policy reforms aimed at making the 
insurance market more efficient - which may adversely affect children’s schooling by 
reducing household uncertainty - should be accompanied by reforms enhancing  
households’ access to credit, thus raising poor households’ investments in the human 
capital of their children.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. KHDS 1994. 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
School attendance 0.663 0.471 
School hours 18.487 16.428 
Age (years) 10.9 2.629 
Age squared 125.7 57.602 
Male 0.513 0.500 
Female head 0.533 0.499 
Mother’s education (years) 4.167 2.877 
Father’s education (years) 5.543 2.855 
Father dead 0.275 0.447 
Mother dead 0.211 0.408 
No. Of adults in the household 2.863 1.607 
No. Of kids 3.659 1.707 
Log(household expenditure) 10.677 0.531 
No. Of teachers per classroom  1.398 0.509 
No. Of blackboards per classroom 0.719 0.219 
Secondary school in the village 1.933 0.249 
Urban area 0.157 0.364 
No durables 0.469 0.499 
No savings 0.192 0.394 
Uncertainty (logs) 18.044 1.141 
uncertainty * No durables 8.408 8.975 
uncertainty * No savings 3.413 7.012 
Observations: 990.  
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Table 2. Coefficients of Tobit Models of School Hours.  
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Age   18.030*** 17.943*** 
  (7.34) (7.56)    
Age squared  -0.612*** -0.607*** 
  (-5.63) (-5.79)    
Male  0.696 0.835    
  (0.63) (0.76)    
Female head   0.596 0.672    
  (0.29) (0.35)    
Mother’s education   0.538*** 0.519*** 
  (2.62) (2.63)    
Father’s education   0.456 0.474    
  (1.34) (1.41)    
Father dead   -3.225 -3.497*   
  (-1.57) (-1.74)    
Mother dead  0.797 1.067    
  (0.49) (0.66)    
No. Adults  0.062 0.202    
  (0.11) (0.35)    
No. Kids  -0.091 0.042    
  (-0.20) (0.10)    
Log(expenditure)  4.331** 4.643*** 
  (2.55) (2.89)    
No. Teachers  4.071 3.385    
  (1.44) (1.25)    
No. Blackboards   10.118* 11.376**  
  (1.84) (2.05)    
Secondary school   -2.573 -2.592    
  (-0.74) (-0.79)    
Urban Area  -4.117 -4.071    
  (-0.98) (-1.06)    
No durables -54.553*** -45.419**                 
 (-3.98) (-2.08)                 
Uncertainty -0.833 -1.239 -0.094    
 (-1.46) (-1.03) (-0.15)    
uncertainty  * no durables 2.630*** 2.364**                 
 (3.50) (1.98)                 
No savings   -81.165*   
   (-1.86)    
uncertainty  * no savings   4.411*   
   (1.79)    
Constant 18.687 -136.008*** -161.717*** 
 (1.58) (-5.63) (-6.97)    
                   
standard error of the regression (sigma) 22.859*** 19.079*** 19.133*** 
 (30.83) (29.10) (28.77)    
Notes: Observations: 990. Month of the interview and community dummies are added in all models. Robust t 
statistics in parentheses. *, **,  *** significant at 10%; 5% and 1%, respectively.  
